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 Abstract 
 
This paper explores the implications of women’s work in agriculture in Telangana, a region in the 
state of Andhra Pradesh, India. I suggest that higher capital costs for cultivators post-
liberalization increased the pressure to contain wage costs in a region where women form the 
majority of the agricultural wage labour force. Under such conditions, when women perform both 
own-cultivation as well as agricultural wage work in the fields of others, they face pressure to 
restrict bargaining for higher wages, contributing to a widening gender wage gap. To the extent 
that wages shape intra-household bargaining power, the empowering effect of workforce 
participation for such women would thus be blunted. From available NSS data I provide some 
preliminary evidence in support of this argument.  
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Introduction 
 There now exists a significant body of work studying the determinants of women’s 
bargaining power within households and evaluating the conditions under which labour force 
participation may or may not translate into women’s increased bargaining power in developing 
country contexts. While wage employment is considered an important potential determinant of 
increased female bargaining power within the household,  it has become clear that its impact 
depends upon the pecuniary and non-pecuniary conditions under which women work, as well as 
the reasons why they participate (Agarwal 1997; Charusheela 2003).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 This paper attempts to contribute to this literature through a study of women’s work in 
rural Telangana, a relatively poor, agrarian region in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India. This 
region, along with other parts of India, has witnessed two rounds of economic reforms or 
liberalization policies beginning in the early 1990s, first at the national and then at the regional 
government level. The main effect of these polices upon Telangana agriculture in the 1990s was 
‘immiserising growth’ with a sharp increase in the input costs of agriculture at a time when yields 
and output prices either fell or remained stagnant, exacerbating the problem of indebtedness 
amongst farmers (Vakulabharanam 2005, Rao and Suri 2006). The effects of this agrarian crisis, 
compounded by the weakened political voice of farmers in post-liberalization India, are seen as 
contributory factors in the complex phenomenon of the suicides of male farmers in the region 
(Suri 2006, K Nagaraj 2008). This paper adds a gender dimension to the analysis of agrarian 
distress in the 1990s, focusing on the economic role of women in cultivator households during 
this period.  
 While the debate over the causes of farmer suicides has focused attention on the plight of 
male cultivators, I argue that the mechanism of transmission of this agrarian crisis is gendered. 
Apart from the personal and economic consequences of high debt, I argue that there have also 
been specific implications for the wages of women workers in agriculture. Based on observation 
in the field, I suggest that the higher capital costs for cultivators post-liberalization have increased 
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the pressure to contain wage costs in a region where women form the majority of the agricultural 
wage labour force. Under such conditions, when women perform both own-cultivation as well as 
agricultural wage work in the fields of others, they face greater pressure to restrict bargaining for 
higher wages. To the extent that wages are a determinant of intra-household bargaining power, a 
widening gender wage differential reduces the chances that wage work will increase women’s 
bargaining power within the household. As a result the empowering effect of workforce 
participation for such women may have been blunted in the aftermath of liberalization.  
 I use village level field observations to motivate the study and individual level National 
Sample Survey(NSS) wage data to test the argument. While the availability of data does limit the 
strength of the findings, they do suggest the validity of more research on women’s changing roles 
as cultivators in India.  
  The literature on rural livelihood diversification suggests that older models of rural 
households that assumed clear separations between different occupations, and the specialization 
of household members in particular tasks may not be valid in many contexts (Ellis 1998). The 
workers in Telangana I discuss were certainly engaged in the pursuit of multiple occupations. 
This paper explores the implications of one subset of occupations performed by female workers 
in the region’s agriculture.  
The Agricultural Workforce in Telangana  
Telangana is an interesting region to study, not just because of its long history of political 
mobilization around issues of land redistribution, but also because Telangana, to an even greater 
extent than other parts of South India, has a history of women’s participation in the agricultural 
labour force (Sundarrayya 1972; Mies 1986; Lalitha and Kannabiran 1989). According to the 
Indian Census, the female workforce participation rates of women in rural Telangana have been 
around 40% over the last two decades, the highest rates of Andhra Pradesh’s three sub-regions.  
In this section I trace the broad trends in the agricultural labour force in Telangana before 
and immediately after liberalization using individual level data provided by the National Sample 
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Survey (NSS)Quinquennial Employment and Unemployment Household Surveys. The NSS  
‘rounds’ used for analysis in this chapter are the 38th round (83-84), the 43rd round (1987-88), the 
50
th
 round (93-94) and the 55
th
 round (99-00). Given that liberalization policies were instituted at 
the national level in 1991 but at the state level in 93-94, the 99-00 round is treated as the post-
liberalization period. Adults are defined as persons aged 15 and above in accordance with the 
convention in Indian social science research. 
 In this paper, the term ‘economically active’ includes as workers both those performing 
domestic/ household reproductive labour as well as non-domestic work. The term ‘non-domestic 
worker’ excludes those engaged principally in reproductive work. 1% of the total male and 0.79% 
of the total female worker population also reported their status as unemployed. Since their 
occupational-type cannot be determined, they are excluded from the analysis in this paper. 
The NSS surveys provide us with data on the ‘principal usual status’ of employment of 
each member of the households surveyed. This is the occupation the respondent reports having 
pursued for a majority of the year (i.e. 183 days or more). The NSS also asks respondents to list 
their ‘daily status’, or the four most significant activities for the week in which they are being 
interviewed. The survey then asks for the days they spent on each activity, and the total weekly 
wages earned in the activities performed for hire. The occupation followed for a majority of days 
in the week is then listed as the respondent’s ‘current weekly status’(cws). 
Researchers of  households in poor agrarian economies cast doubt upon the conceptual 
usefulness of a ‘principal status’ classification, arguing that it obscures the multiple other forms 
of work that respondents may be engaged in (Ellis 1998). Feminists have meanwhile long argued 
against the use of such categories, given that women have almost always pursued multiple 
occupations simultaneously indeed often and reported domestic work as their ‘principal status’ 
while engaging in different forms of part-time or seasonal non-domestic work. I combine 
‘principal’ and ‘weekly’ status data in the initial analysis of macro-level trends to try to widen the 
category somewhat. However, given the diversity of livelihood strategies pursued by rural 
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households and particularly by women in these households, I later shift to the use of NSS ‘daily 
status’ data. This allows me to include as wage labourers or cultivators those who report it as 
being any one of their four activities in the week. The ‘daily status’ data also allows us to try to 
explain the determinants of wages paid to individual workers.  
 Due to a steady increase in the number of adults reported as continuing students, the more 
conventional female labour force participation rate (i.e. participation in non-domestic work) did 
not increase. However, the percentage of principal and weekly status female non-domestic 
workers within the pool of economically active adult women has risen over successive rounds, 
i.e. the share of women reporting their occupation as domestic work has correspondingly fallen 
(Table 1). The rise has been particularly steep after 1987-88 with up to 83% of economically 
active women engaged primarily in non-domestic work by 99-00.  
(Table 1 about here) 
 Combining principal and weekly status, we see a rising percentage of economically 
active adult women and men employed in agriculture between 93-94 and 90-00 (Table 2).  This 
trend is quite the opposite of that predicted by proponents of liberalization in Andhra Pradesh 
who expected the share of the population in agriculture to fall steadily and go down to 20% by 
2020 (GoAP 1999).  
(Table 2 about here) 
In line with historical trends, women comprised 55% of the agricultural wage labour 
force in 99-00 while men were in a majority when it came to own-account cultivators (Table 2). 
While participation in the wage labour force did not change much post-liberalization, the share of 
both men and women reporting cultivation did increase, although the increase for women was 
slightly higher. Thus, between 93-94 and 99-00 it was cultivation that absorbed the bulk of the 
shift of both men and women into agricultural employment. This, combined with the decline (as 
per NSS estimates) in the absolute number of men and women reporting performing principal or 
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weekly status non-agricultural work suggests increasingly reliance upon agriculture for rural 
families, and thus an increased vulnerability to agrarian distress.  
 To summarise, the data for the period 93-94 to 99-00 shows i) the deepening reliance 
upon agriculture as a source of livelihood in rural Telangana; ii) the persistence of a historically 
feminized agricultural wage labour force and iii) the rising share of women and men in own-
account agricultural work. 
The decrease in women reporting their principal or weekly status occupation as 
‘domestic’ work may account for at least part of the inflow of female workers into agriculture. 
Supporters of liberalization have certainly pointed to the movement of women into the workforce 
as one of the primary benefits of increased liberalization (World Bank 2000).  
Given the prior discussion of the diversity of women’s occupations, one caveat here is 
that this change more likely reflects an increase in hours devoted to non-domestic work, rather 
than a shift from purely domestic to primarily non-domestic work. However, it certainly could be 
the case that the increases in agricultural work were driven by increased demand and thus had 
positive rather than negative welfare implications.  What complicates the picture in Telangana is 
that changes in agricultural wages in this period do not support such an interpretation. I now turn 
to a discussion of the changes in real agricultural wages to more closely examine the welfare 
implications of the increased participation in agriculture.  
Agricultural Wages in Telangana 
 Telangana witnessed significant agricultural real wage growth during the 1970s – the 
time of a violent Maoist peasant struggle and associated redistributions of land – as well as 
through the 1980s when a wave of commercialization under the newly small-farmer dominated 
agrarian structure commenced. In the 1990s however, one of the most significant changes in the 
agrarian economy was the slowing of real wage growth for both male and female agricultural 
labourers. From average exponential rates of growth of 4.5% from 1980 to 1989, real wage 
growth slowed to around 1.5% between 1990 and 2000 (Vakulabharanam 2004). Indeed there 
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was a negative correlation between agricultural output growth and real wage growth from 1994 to 
2000 for this region (Vakulabharanam 2004). 
Recent reviews of wage data from different sources indicate that this overall slowdown in 
agricultural wage growth in the 1990s has been accompanied by a widening of the gender wage 
differential at the wider Andhra Pradesh state level (Chavan and Bedamatta 2006; Srivastava and 
Singh 2006). In Telangana too, both the NSS data for ‘daily status’ agricultural wage labourers 
and annual district level agricultural wage data collected by the Ministry of Agricultural Statistics 
suggest that in real terms, the gap between male and female wage growth widened over the 
period. The district level data shows some fluctuations, but indicates overall an average annual 
growth of 3% in the real gender wage differential from 93-94 to 00-01 (Figure 1).  NSS data 
points to a sharper increase of 14% in the gender wage gap between 93-94 and 99-00 (Table 4). 
(Fig 1 about here) 
Within a demand and supply perspective, the trends noted earlier of increasing shares of 
the work force reporting agricultural work in general and own-account agriculture in particular, 
point to one possible explanation for stagnant agricultural wage growth. The increased use of 
family labour in agriculture has countered the wage effects of increased demand for labour within 
agriculture. To the extent that this trend is stronger for women, the impact on female agricultural 
wages is greater.  
However, there may be a different way in which the increased use of female family 
labour in agriculture impacts the agricultural wage labour force.  
If we shift our attention away from purely supply and demand factors to the underlying 
institutional factors that influence wage setting in these markets, we could argue that the 
persistent and widening gender wage gap implies that women agricultural wage labourers were 
less successful in negotiating wage increases in the post-liberalization period. In a period when 
rates of inflation observed for the Consumer Price Index (Agricultural Labourers) from 1993 to 
2001 averaged 9% p.a., close to double those observed in the 80s (Reddy, Galab and Rao 2003), 
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agricultural wage labourers would have had to negotiate significantly higher nominal wage 
increases in the 1990s to be able to account for increased inflation rates in this period. Perhaps 
women wage workers have been less able to do so in 1990s Telangana.  
 Previous research has suggested that socialization processes that emphasise female 
obedience and passivity may explain why women workers do not push for higher wages (Seguino 
2000). Without denying the importance of socialization, I argue based on my fieldwork data that 
as a result of the division of labour within cultivator households in Telangana, many women 
agricultural labourers who also perform cultivation work are under greater pressure to restrict 
wage bargaining. Farms in the region are relatively female-labour intensive implying that a rise in 
female wages has a greater negative impact upon farm profits. I also argue that this pressure may 
have intensified post-liberalization. The conventional understanding of women and men from 
cultivator households is that they have stronger fallback positions than those with no cultivable 
land and thus are better able to negotiate favourable economic outcomes. My hypothesis is that 
this relationship does not necessarily hold given the particular gender division of labour in the 
region and rising capital costs for farmers post-liberalization. 
The NSS data used later in the paper to test this hypothesis does limit the study in at least 
two ways. The gender wage gap being analyzed here may partly be the result of gendered 
migration trends putting upward pressure on male wages. There is no direct evidence on 
migration in the NSS data for 93-94, preventing this hypothesis from being tested. However, as 
seen earlier, the NSS employment data indicate increasing absolute numbers as well as 
percentages of men involved in agriculture (and specifically in cultivation) between 93-94 and 
99-00. Even if the survey misses some men who have migrated, the ones who remain are more 
rather than less involved with agriculture compared to the previous round, mitigating any upward 
pressure on male wages due to migration. Indeed, as discussed earlier, the literature on the region 
suggests that the wage increases even men experienced were smaller than increases experienced 
in the 1980s.  
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 A second caveat is that the NSS data only partially accounts for differing workday 
lengths, differentiating between a ‘half day’ (counted as 0.5 days) and a ‘full day’ (counted as 1 
day). However, it does not capture finer variations in hours within those two categories. Part of 
any gender wage gap observed may be a result of differing lengths of the ‘full’ work day for 
women and men. However, given that the measurement is done in a consistent manner across the 
two rounds, any changes in the gender wage gap from one period to another would have to result 
from a reduction in average daily hours of work for women in 99-00 compared to 93-94, while 
male hours remained the same or increased.  There is little evidence from non-NSS sources to 
suggest that this may be the case. One study that does evaluate male and female work hours in the 
neighboring region of Rayalseema argues that in the early 1990s female work hours in agriculture 
actually increased (DaCorta andVenkateshwarulu 1999). While there is no way to directly test 
this hypothesis with the available NSS data for Telangana, if women’s work hours as cultivators 
actually increased as a means of cutting wage costs, then this study would tend to underestimate 
the gender wage gap. 
I now turn to my fieldwork to present a more micro-level picture of the conditions under 
which men and women labour in Telangana. 
The View from the Field 
The Gender Division of Labour in Agriculture 
 My fieldwork took place in two Telangana villages, Nayanunipalle and Khanapur, 
located in Mahbubnagar district where I spent nine months from July, 2001 to March 2002 as part 
of dissertation work on gender, liberalization and agrarian change in Telangana. It included 
participant observation as well as surveys and interviews conducted over this period. I use this 
fieldwork to provide the context for the hypothesis being tested in this paper.  
 As other studies in South India have noted, while male tasks in the agricultural cycle vary 
by crop, they most often include ploughing, transport, clearing of fields, digging irrigation ditches 
and guarding the crops at night (Kapadia 1995; DaCorta and Venkateshwarulu 1999). The first of 
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these tasks has, to some extent, been taken over by the tractor, the most important reason I was 
given for the reduced demand for male agricultural labour in recent times. On the other hand, a 
different aspect of men’s work as cultivators was becoming increasingly important. It was only 
men who travelled outside the village both to buy crucial inputs into production – fertilisers, 
pesticides, seeds – as well as to sell the harvested crop in wholesale markets. Negotiating these 
deals was crucial to the success of the farm -- the process of ‘immiserising growth’ in 
Telangana’s agriculture discussed earlier is believed to be a result of the structural inability of 
farmers in this region to negotiate favourable terms with suppliers of credit and other inputs 
(Vakulabharanam 2005). 
 Despite men owning land and listing themselves as cultivators more often than women, 
women’s work is crucial to agricultural production due to the “sex-sequential” (Agarwal 1994) 
nature of agricultural tasks. The important operations of sowing, weeding, transplanting and 
harvesting are performed by women as has been documented by various studies on Telangana 
(Mies and Lalita 1986; Revathi 1994;Ramamurthy 2000). Apart from women workers being 
required to perform the above tasks in the agricultural cycle, women in a farmer household are 
responsible for another key task -- the recruiting, supervision and payment of female agricultural 
labourers.  
 Most of my interviews with women took place early in the morning before women left 
for work, and during the peak agricultural season these interviews were constantly punctuated by 
visits from other women seeking to recruit the group of ten or so female labourers that most small 
farms required to carry out sowing or transplanting work for the day. Given the simultaneous 
peaking of demand, this was not always an easy task, and I witnessed long drawn out arguments 
between the women about promises to come to work made and broken. For women in cultivator 
households, significant time and energy thus went into the recruitment of other women workers. 
The best way to secure labour seemed to be to agree to work on a woman’s field to ensure her 
reciprocity when it came to one’s own labour needs.  
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Better-off, upper caste women did not perform labour in the fields of others even though 
their supervisory role was extremely important. I closely observed three ‘kapu’ (landlord) women 
from families with landholdings of greater than 50 acres. They were always there when women 
labourers were performing the tasks of transplanting and weeding; they supervised the ploughing 
of rice fields by male labourers; and when the family’s cattle were brought home every night by 
their ‘jeetagadu’ or male hired labourer, they kept an eye on whether they were all back safely. 
Their husbands travelled a great deal to the urban centres of Mahbubnagar and Hyderabad, 
involved, as many other men seemed to be, in negotiations around procuring inputs for the farm, 
diversifying the family’s investments in the city and building and maintaining networks of family 
and friends that were crucial to success in both of those endeavours. 
Given than they did not actually hire their own labour out, however, in seasons of high 
labour demand these upper-caste women needed ways of recruiting women without just the 
incentive of very high wages. Recruiting women labourers under these circumstances depended a 
great deal upon the relations that the women of the household maintained with women in the 
village through the year. Whether it was letting women watch television in the house or lending 
them money or milk, there were a variety of ways in which relationships of trust and dependence 
were established between the women of these large powerful households and other women of the 
village despite the decline of more obvious relations of dependence such as bonded labour. The 
success of the family farm thus depended in both more and less obvious ways upon the women of 
the household. 
Implications of the gender division of labour for wage bargaining  
While numerous field studies document women’s role as agricultural workers in India, 
economic models of small farm production that explain the impact of economic policies such as 
structural adjustment while taking into account women’s role as producers are less common. Such 
models have been developed for the African context to show that taking the gender division of 
labour into account helps to explain the ‘perverse’ supply response of food output in Africa 
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(Darity 1995, Warner and Campbell 2000, Evers and Walters 2001).  Unlike Africa, however, 
crops are not defined as ‘male’ or ‘female’ in India. Instead tasks within the work cycle for each 
crop are defined as ‘male’ or female so that any crop cultivated requires a certain amount of male 
labour and a certain amount of female labour.  
Models of rural household production decisions that extend beyond the African context 
have tended to focus upon the implications of women’s contributions to the production of 
household goods and thus the impact of macroeconomic policies upon their leisure time and 
intensity of work (Floro 1995; Braunstein 2004). In this paper the focus is on women’s 
contribution to farm output rather than to household goods. The underlying argument links female 
work and wages using a ‘bargaining power approach’ (Seiz 1994). While Appendix 1 provides a 
formal mathematical model, in this section I discuss the logic of this underlying model in non-
mathematical terms.  
The fundamental insight of bargaining models is that economic outcomes – intra-
household allocation of resources, for example – are negotiated rather than being simple 
responses to prices and relative differences in productivity (Quisumbing 2003). Empirical 
evidence has cast doubt upon traditional “unitary” models of the household, leading to the 
increasing use of collective models of the household in which the preferences of individual 
household members can differ, and income streams are not wholly pooled (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio 2000). For feminists this approach has proved to be an interesting way to raise issues of 
power despite concerns about methodological individualism and the emphasis upon quantifiable 
‘material’ bases of bargaining power rather than contestation over symbolic meanings 
(Charusheela 2003).  
Along with education and asset ownership, wages are widely seen as an important 
determinant of bargaining power, but, as Agarwal (1997) points out, they also need to be 
bargained for, setting up the possibility of virtuous or vicious cycles in which the outcomes of 
intra-household bargaining affect and are affected by extra-household outcomes such as wages. 
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Research in rural South India suggests that wages in the region are impacted both by the 
forces of demand and supply as well as by explicit bargaining (Ramamurthy 2000; Kapadia 
1995). The effect of the former was seen in the fact that in both Telangana villages discussed 
above, there was a clear ‘peak’ wage that corresponded to the period of high agricultural demand. 
Villagers pointed to the impact upon wages of seasonal out-migration and construction work in 
nearby towns. But I was also told by Dalit women “haven’t the prices of chillies and salt risen? 
We all got together and made the ‘kapollu’ (large farmers) pay us more”. While I did not have the 
opportunity to study the influence of work gangs (“guttis”in Telangana) several respondents did 
mention that wages were higher “since we have ‘guttis’”, implying that bargaining by workers 
did matter. 
An important implication of the nature of women’s involvement in the agrarian economy 
in Telangana is that we do not find a gender differentiated employer–worker relationship within 
agriculture, but instead a network within which wage workers in agriculture are predominantly 
women, as are those who most directly recruit, supervise and pay them.  In fact in villages like 
Nayanunipalle where most households own and farm some land, women from a cultivator 
household typically accompany the group of female wage workers recruited for the day to the 
farmland and work alongside them till the end of the day before paying them, only to reverse the 
process the next day as part of a group recruited to work on another woman’s farm.  
 In conversations with women and NGO workers this emerged as a possible reason for the 
persistent gender wage differential that remained in agriculture. Several women justified rather 
than protested against the existence of the gender wage differential, repeating the statement that 
“men do heavier work” even in the face of NGO workers’ arguments that women’s work was just 
as burdensome and “heavy”.  One could argue make the ‘false consciousness’ argument that 
gendered processes of socialization blind women to the parity between the work they do and the 
work that men do (see Agarwal (1997) for a critique). However, context does seem to matter 
here. Hart (1991) describes the situation in Malaysia where women agricultural workers seemed 
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to exhibit greater signs of class consciousness than male workers. Within Telangana, the 
reluctance of agricultural workers to organize contrasted sharply with successful union organizing 
of women ‘beedi’ (home-rolled cigarettes) workers in the very same villages.  
Caste and class clearly play a crucial role in segmenting the female agricultural labour 
force, with even women agricultural workers from the same caste divided by class (Agarwal 
1994; Kapadia 1995). Telangana is no different – ‘beedi’ work was dominated by Dalits, who are 
also less likely to own land – but discussions with NGO workers regarding the practicalities of 
organizing female agricultural labourers brought up another possible explanation for women’s 
reluctance to organize.  
For women who are both own-account farm workers as well as wage workers, the 
economic benefits of increases in real wages are ambiguous. The wage they receive today must 
be paid out to someone else tomorrow. A family farm of an acre would employ perhaps one day 
of male labour to dig ditches or help the man of the household complete ploughing. The same 
farm, on the other hand, would employ at least ten women days of labour to complete weeding 
and transplanting alone. Of the wage cost of this farm, men’s wages would account for a much 
smaller share. The stakes these women have as workers in rising agricultural wages are thus 
offset by their concern for keeping the costs of production down – particularly as the costs of 
inputs such as fertilisers and electricity have gone up post-liberalization. Under conditions of 
reduced profitability in agriculture increases in female own-account cultivation work may then be 
accompanied by widening gender wage differentials in agriculture and, as a consequence, 
possibly even falling female intra-household bargaining power. 
Testing the Hypothesis 
 The hypothesis being tested here is that the broad climate of agrarian distress in 
Telangana in the post liberalization period has resulted in female agricultural wage workers from 
cultivator households facing greater pressure to restrict bargaining over agricultural wages. Given 
that some men also occupy this ‘dual class’ status, the negative impact of own-account cultivation 
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upon male agricultural wages may exist, but the greater impact of higher female wages upon farm 
profits implies that such effects would be stronger for women.  
Given that many women and men from cultivator households may only perform 
occasional agricultural wage work, I use the NSS’ ‘daily status’ data to identify economically 
active, adult men and women who report any agricultural wage work at all,  whether for a  
minority or majority of their working week.  Similarly, I use the same daily status data to identify 
male and female adult workers who perform some own-account agricultural or cultivation work 
(including as unpaid helpers on their family farms). 
For both men and women, there was a sharp and almost identical increase in the 
percentage of ‘daily status’ agricultural wage workers reporting some cultivation work as well 
(Table 3). The percentage for men started out a little higher and remained so in 99-00. However, 
given the larger number of female agricultural wage labourers, in absolute terms NSS estimates 
the number of such ‘dual class’ female workers increased by more.  
(Table 3 about here) 
Using the individual level NSS data on ‘daily status’, I also obtained agricultural wage 
data from the responses of those who reported agricultural labour as any one of their top four 
activities for the week. An average agricultural daily wage was calculated for each such 
respondent. This was deflated using the Andhra Pradesh Consumer Price Index for Agricultural 
Labourers with a base year of 86-87 (=100), so that the real wage figures reported below are in 
86-87 rupees. To provide a comparison to current prices, the index was 4.5 times larger in 2008-
09 (448) than in 86-87(100).  
(Table 4 about here) 
 As can be seen in Table 4, the gender wage differential widened in 99-00. Table 5 
suggests that average wages did not rise as much for female wage labourers overall, and 
marginally less for women reporting some cultivation work, when compared to their male 
counterparts. While in both NSS rounds male ‘dual class’ workers had higher average wages, for 
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women this was, if at all, only the case in 93-94.  While higher average wages for ‘dual class’ 
male workers confirm the conventional hypothesis that such workers have higher fallback 
positions, the evidence for women is less clear.  A two-sample group mean test did not confirm 
that this difference was statistically significant.  
(Table 5 about here) 
 To more rigorously test the hypothesis that the unfolding of liberalization in this region 
may have negatively impacted the underlying bargaining position of ‘dual class’ women, I turn to 
regression analysis. I use the wage data to evaluate the extent to which the wages of women may 
be held down, post-liberalization, by their dual role as both own-account as well as wage workers 
in agriculture.  
Regression Analysis 
 The analysis of agricultural wage work differs from regression analysis of wages in 
formal industrial or service sector contexts, in that compensation is unlikely to depend upon 
conventional measures of skill such as years of education. Unsurprisingly, a majority of both men 
and women in this dataset had not completed even primary school. Age provides the best proxy 
for experience, but at the same time can be a liability in what is physically taxing work. Trying to 
explain the wage earned by a worker in this context is thus likely to be challenging. 
In this paper I use a standard ordinary least squares(OLS) regression technique, with the 
dependent variable being the log average agricultural wage reported.  I restrict the sample to adult 
men and women who report performing some daily status agricultural wage labour. An 
alternative to the use of OLS would be to use a correction for sample selection bias in a double 
selection framework, given that workers must first choose to be economically active and then 
choose to perform agricultural wage labour. Results using this double selection method are 
available upon request from the author but since they did not differ from those obtained using 
OLS, I report only the latter in this paper.  
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Turning to the independent variables used in the wage regression, the variables relevant 
to the hypothesis being tested are: 
i)  A dummy variable to indicate whether daily status agricultural workers (male and female 
combined) also reported any daily status cultivation work and thus occupied this ‘dual class’ 
status. As mentioned earlier, members of cultivator households are generally believed to have 
higher fallback positions and thus better able to bargain for higher wages.   
ii) A time, gender and occupation interaction dummy that tests whether such the effect of being 
such a dual-class status worker had a negative effect for women in 99-00. My hypothesis suggests 
that this variable would have a negative and statistically significant coefficient.  
 I also use conventional group and household level characteristics to control for other 
possible determinants of wages earned.  
(Table 6 about here) 
I use the district within which the worker resides to control for possible regional 
variations in wages. Apart from age (along with a squared term) and primary school completion, I 
include the worker ratio, assuming that larger households with higher worker ratios may have 
better fallback positions and thus allow workers greater bargaining power and wages. Female 
headed households are, however, generally considered to have lower fallback positions, 
increasing the ‘push’ to obtain work. 
Membership in the least privileged scheduled caste/tribe groups could have a negative 
effect upon wages if such workers have lower bargaining power because of their lower social 
status. However, sociologists have pointed out a different, perhaps looser, model of patriarchy at 
work in lower caste groups that may result in female workers from these groups more effectively 
pushing for higher wages.  
 I also include dummies indicating whether the worker was unmarried, as well as whether 
the spouse (or household head if unmarried/spouse not specified) had completed at least primary 
school, and whether the spouse (or household head if unmarried/spouse not specified) was a 
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principal or weekly status agricultural worker. Given the linkage between marriage and status in 
Indian households, being unmarried may in fact decrease bargaining power for women, although 
the impact for men is less clear. The impacts of spousal education and occupation upon fall back 
positions depend upon the workings of patriarchy in these households and are thus theoretically 
ambiguous in a sample that combines men and women.  
A dummy variable indicating whether the worker was female tests whether a gender 
wage differential remains after controlling for these individual and household characteristics. A 
time interaction term for gender tests whether the gender wage differential increased in 99-00, all 
else constant. 
 
Results of Regression Analysis  
The results of ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors are reported in 
Table 7, Regression 1. The overall fit of the regression appears acceptable based upon F-test and 
adjusted R- square results. The fact that the adjusted R-square is 0.31 is not surprising since 
agricultural wage earnings in developing countries tend to be difficult to explain fully.  
(Table 7 about here) 
Age has a positive effect upon wages, as it would if it was a proxy for experience, but the 
effect diminishes with years. This is expected given the physically taxing nature of the work. 
Also as expected, the completion of primary school did not have a statistically significant effect 
upon wages earned. Somewhat surprisingly, caste, the household worker ratio and being from a 
female headed household did not have statistically significant effects upon wages earned. Being 
unmarried had a statistically significant negative effect upon wages, while the education and 
occupation of the spouse/household head did not.  
 The time dummy tells us that wages did rise in 99-00, as we saw in the tables earlier, but 
female workers earned less after controlling for these other individual and household level 
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variables. The statistical significance of the time and gender interaction dummy confirms that the 
gender wage differential widened in 99-00.  
Overall, cultivation work did indeed have a positive effect upon wages as usually 
expected. However, the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the time, gender and 
cultivation interaction term indicates that women who reported some own-account work did see a 
greater decline in wage growth in 99-00. F-tests confirmed that both the coefficients were 
statistically significantly non-zero.  
These results are in accordance with the hypothesis presented earlier, even though the 
effect does not appear to be very large. Importantly, if female cultivator work days increased in 
length, this may lead to an underestimation of this effect.  Furthermore, the lowered bargaining 
power of ‘dual class’ female workers does not completely explain the increased gender wage 
differential in 99-00, given that the time_gender interaction dummy continues to be statistically 
significant. As previously discussed, gendered migration trends may play a role as well. 
However, this result does point to one possible way that women’s wages have been adversely 
affected in aftermath of liberalization and suggests the need for further research on the changing 
nature of women’s role as cultivators. 
Alternative Specification 
In the specification above, the time, gender and cultivation dummy could simply be 
picking up the impact of increased cultivation work by both genders in the 99-00 period. 
Controlling for this possibility requires the inclusion of an additional interaction term, 
time_cultivation, which is the product of the time dummy and the dummy for reported cultivation 
work. Including this term proves to be problematic due to the high correlation (0.7) between the 
time_cultivation and time_gender_cultivation dummies. Given my argument that in absolute 
terms more women became ‘dual class’ workers between NSS rounds 50 and 55, this high 
correlation is not surprising. However, it means that the inclusion of both these interaction terms 
raises the problem of multicollinearity. As seen in Table 7, Regression 2, after including 
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time_cultivation term, both time_gender_cultivation and time_cultivation become insignificant at 
the 5% level (and the confidence intervals vary across zero).  
To resolve this specification issue therefore, Table 7, Regression 3 reports the results of 
dropping the time_gender_cultivation term. The time_cultivation interaction term alone is 
statistically insignificant, indicating that the effect upon agricultural wages of being a ‘dual class’ 
worker is likely to be specific to the women in the sample.  
Implications of the results 
In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of the agrarian distress experienced 
in the Telangana region post-liberalisation for women in cultivator households. The empirical 
analysis above suggests one possible mechanism by which the pressures faced by farm 
households affected women workers. To the extent that wage growth for women is restricted to a 
greater degree, and to the extent that wage earnings do in fact impact women’s bargaining power, 
the regression results imply that wage work for these women became less rather than more 
empowering. As the wider feminist literature on the effects on economic crises suggests, the 
transmission mechanisms of crises, in this case in agriculture, are likely to be gendered and 
women often bear the burden of adjusting to crises in ways that are not obvious to policy makers.  
In the last four years the national and state governments in India have paid greater 
attention to the generation of rural employment and limited social safety net programs. This paper 
restricts itself to the immediate aftermath of liberalization in Telangana. Further research is 
required to examine the impacts of programs such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme(NREGS) upon women workers in this region. However, while the NREGS provides 
much-needed additional rural employment, this paper focuses more on the pressures faced by 
cultivators and  the ways in which the deterioration of conditions for cultivators in the region can 
undermine efforts to prop up real wages. The problem of rising capital costs for cultivator 
households has still not received sufficient attention from policymakers.  
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The result also suggests that while the unionization of agricultural wage labourers is one 
of the most important outstanding tasks of the labour movement in India, in regions like 
Telangana women agricultural workers face contradictory pulls and may or may not respond to 
calls to organise. 
Conclusions  
 Women’s labour force participation is a potentially important determinant of improved 
bargaining outcomes for women. The literature suggests both that the conditions under which 
women labour and the reasons why they participate shape the extent to which this potential for 
empowerment is realised. Rural Telangana, the part of India studied in this paper has traditionally 
had a feminized agricultural labour force. However, agricultural wage growth in Telangana 
slowed in the immediate aftermath of liberalization, while the gender wage gap widened.   
 Based on field observation of the gender division of labour within agriculture in the 
region, I use a household model to explore the link between women’s roles in own-farm work, 
women’s wage labour in agriculture and their bargaining power within the household. Given the 
pressure on profit margins as a result of rising input costs post-liberalization, I argue that female 
labourers’ ability to bargain for higher wages within agriculture is adversely affected by the dual 
position several of these women occupy in being both cultivators and agricultural wage labourers.  
Despite data limitations, NSS surveys provide some evidence for the latter hypothesis suggesting 
that there is a need for further research that takes into account the impact of economic policies 
upon women, not just as consumers or as wage labourers, but as important contributors to small 
farm agriculture in India. 
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Tables 
 
Fig 1: Real Wage Growth in Telangana from 1993 to 2001   
(with exponential growth trend lines fitted) 
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Source: Agricultural Wages in Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad: Directorate of Economics and Statistics.  
 
 
Table 1: Rural Telangana: Participation in the labour force 
 
 
The economically active 
as a share of adults 
Non-domestic workers as a share of 
all economically active adults 
 Male  Female Male  Female 
82-83 91.5 92.7 99.7 79.3 
87-88 91.2 91.3 99.8 79.6 
93-94 89.8 91.7 99.8 81.4 
99-00 87.8 88.9 99.8 82.8 
Source: NSSO, various years 
 
 
Table 2 Rural Telangana: Agricultural work as a share of economically active adults 
 
 
Principal and weekly status 
cultivators  
Principal and weekly status 
agricultural wage labour  
All agricultural work  
 Male Female 
Female  
share Male  Female 
Female  
share Male  Female  
Female  
share 
82-83 41.2 30.5 44 35.7 38.9 53.6 61.3 47.1 44.9 
87-88 41.5 28.8 41.7 35.0 40.6 54.4 62.1 48.2 44.5 
93-94 41.3 31.9 44.6 36.8 41.3 53.9 65.6 57.8 47.9 
99-00 42.7 33.9 45.6 35.6 41.5 54.8 68.4 62.5 48.7 
Source: NSSO, various years 
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Table 3: Rural Telangana: Agriculture in ‘daily status’ data (percentages of economically 
active adults) 
 
 Agricultural wage labour Cultivation work 
Percentage of wage labourers 
reporting some cultivation work  
 Male  Female  
Female  
share Male  Female  
Female  
share Male  Female 
93-94 32.6 33.3 51.6 41.7 29.5 42.5 7.2 6.58 
99-00 32.9 36.6 53.6 46.4 34.5 43.6 14.34 13.56 
 
Source: NSSO, various years 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Rural Telangana: Real average agricultural wage per day (in 86-87 rupees) 
(Adult, economically active, daily status agricultural workers) 
 
 Male  Female  
Female share 
of male wage 
93-94 8.68 Rs 6.44 Rs 74.2% 
99-00 12.15 Rs 7.78 Rs 64.0% 
Source: NSSO, Rounds 50 and 55. Deflated by AP CPI(AL). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Rural Telangana: Real average agricultural wage per day by occupation of worker 
(in 86-87 Rupees) 
(Adult, economically active, daily status agricultural workers) 
 
 Male agricultural labourers Female agricultural labourers 
 
No reported 
cultivation 
Cultivation 
work reported 
No reported 
cultivation 
Cultivation 
work reported 
93-94 8.6 10.2 6.4 6.5 
99-00 12 12.9 7.8 7.8 
Source: NSSO, Rounds 50 and 55. Deflated by AP CPI(AL). 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in regression  
(Adult, economically active, daily status agricultural workers) 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
(Log) Average agricultural wage per 
day 2663  2.07      0.45      -0.47     3.83 
District 2770 22.05 4.01 2 30 
Age 2770 33.23 12.50 15 80 
Age squared 2770 1260.55 949.77 225 6400 
Caste group (SC/ST) 2770 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Primary school completed 2770 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Household worker ratio 2768 0.70 0.22 0.2 1 
Female headed household 2770 0.095 0.29 0 1 
Gender: woman 2770 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Cultivation work also reported 2770 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Unmarried 2770 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Spouse/Household head primary 
school completion 2770 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Spouse/Household head agricultural 
worker 2770 0.84 0.36 0 1 
99-00 time dummy 2770 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Time_gender interaction term 2770 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Time_gender_cultivation interaction 
terms 2770 0.040 0.20 0 1 
Time_cultivation interaction term 2770 0.08 0.27 0 1 
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Table 7:  Regression results 
Dependent variable: Log average real agricultural wage  
 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
  Number of obs 2661 Number of obs 2661 Number of obs 2661 
  F( 12,  2648) 85.04  F( 13,  2647) 79.92 F( 12,  2648) 84.56 
  Prob > F 0.000 Prob > F       0.000 Prob > F 0.000 
  R-squared 0.3101 R-squared   0.3103 R-squared 0.3098 
  Root MSE 0.37238 Root MSE  0.37241 Root MSE 0.37247 
Independent variable Coefficient   
Robust 
std. error Coefficient   
Robust 
std. error Coefficient   
Robust 
std. error 
          
region 0.014*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.002 
age 0.011*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.004 
age-squared  -0.0001*** 0.000 -0.0001*** 0.000 -0.0001*** 0.000 
scheduled caste/tribe 
member -0.014 0.015 -0.014 0.015 -0.014 0.015 
primary school 
completed 0.035 0.023 0.036 0.022 0.036 0.022 
household worker 
ratio 0.001 0.035 0.002 0.035 0.002 0.035 
Female-headed 
household 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 
gender: woman -0.314*** 0.024 -0.314*** 0.024 -0.315*** 0.024 
cultivation work also 
reported 0.109*** 0.028 0.131*** 0.045 0.131*** 0.045 
Unmarried -0.071** 0.031 -0.072** 0.031 -0.073** 0.031 
Spouse/Household 
head primary school 
completion -0.016 0.021 -0.016 0.021 -0.016 0.021 
Spouse/Household 
head agricultural 
worker -0.031 0.020 -0.031 0.020 -0.032 0.020 
99-00 time dummy 0.327*** 0.021 0.332*** 0.022 0.337*** 0.022 
time_gender 
interaction term -0.117*** 0.030 -0.120*** 0.030 -0.131*** 0.029 
time_gender 
_cultivation 
interaction term  -0.095** 0.046 -0.074 0.050   
time_cultivation 
interaction term   -0.044 0.056 -0.082 0.051 
_constant 1.607*** 0.089 1.605*** 0.089 1.605*** 0.089 
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Appendix 
 
The Model of the Household 
 Let us assume a two-person peasant household in which the primary source of income is 
cultivation and sale of a single crop. For simplicity, let us assume that women contribute labour to 
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the farm but also perform agricultural wage labour while, due to the feminised nature of the 
agricultural workforce, men perform only own-account farm work. Thus only female wage 
workers are hired for farm work. Furthermore, agricultural wages are the same across female 
workers in a region so that all women are paid the same daily wage.  
 Following Warner and Campbell (2000), the husband and wife maximise individual 
utility functions within a Stackelberg framework. The man has first mover advantage, deciding 
how many hours of female labour Lfh will be hired for the family farm. Women can then decide 
how many hours they will contribute to the farm, Lf0, taking Lfh as a parameter and then spend the 
rest of their fixed extra-household time in agricultural wage work (Lfw). The woman’s reaction 
function becomes an input into the man’s prior decision. 
 Women contribute all of their wage earnings to the household pool and these earnings, 
together with farm profits, constitute the household income, I. Men spend some portion of the 
combined household income upon male consumption goods (such as tea, snacks, cigarettes and 
alcohol) and the remaining is handed over to the woman, whose responsibility it is to buy the 
food and other consumption items jointly consumed by the members of the household. The share 
of combined household income that the woman receives, µf   , is an outcome of household 
bargaining and thus, like bargaining power, is in turn a function of the female wage wf  such that 
δµf / δ wf   >0. 
While bargaining power is an increasing function of wages, it is less clear whether 
bargaining power shows diminishing or increasing returns to wages. The feminist literature tends 
to conclude that at low levels of wages and in the absence of ‘decent’ work, the empowering 
impact of wage work is likely to be small (Charusheela 2003). Thus at low wage levels, 
fw
 fµ
is 
also likely to be small – i.e. incremental increases in wages when wages are low do not increase 
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intra-household bargaining power by as much as when wages are high.   That is, bargaining 
power shows increasing returns to wages so that at low wage rates,  
fw
 fµ
is small. 
 The woman uses her share of household income to buy C f  , the household’s consumption 
of food while the man uses his share to buy G m , goods that are only consumed by the man and 
only enter into his utility function. 
Household Maximization Problem 
The woman and man each maximise utility subject to time and budget constraints.  
Thus the woman’s maximization problem is: 
Max U(Cf)  
Where 
f
f
C
U


> 0, 
2
2
f
f
C
U


<0 
s.t.  
T =  Lfo + Lfw, where T is the fixed total extra-household work time available to the woman 
and  
P f Cf = µf (wf) I  
where I = PQ(L mo , Lfo , Lfh , K) - wf Lfh  - Pk K  + wf  (T - Lfo) 
P, P f ,wf  ,Pk ,Q, Lfo , Lmo, Lfh > 0 
K is fixed in the short run and Lfh is determined by the husband so that Lfo  = f(Lfh ). 
Q is a production function that exhibits diminishing returns in each input. 
The man’s maximization problem becomes: 
Max U(Cf, , Gm,)  
Where 
f
f
C
U


> 0, 
2
2
f
f
C
U


<0; and 
m
f
G
U


> 0, 
2
2
m
f
G
U


<0. 
s.t. 
T =  Lmo , where T is the total non-leisure time available to the man and is fixed. 
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and  
P mGm = (1-µf (wf)) I  , where K and Lmo are fixed and Lfo =f(Lfh). 
By substitution, 
Cf, =  (µf (wf)/ P f ) I   
And Gm= fC
 m) ff
fff
P(w µ
)P(w µ-(1
 
The first order condition for an optimal solution for the woman is: 
δ U f /δ Lfo =0;  
δU f /δ Cf >0  =>  δ Cf /δ Lfo =0   
=> δ Q/δ Lfo= wf/P …………….(i) 
and the first order condition for the man’s optimization problem is: 
δ Um/δ Lfh =0; 
δ U m /δ Cf >0 and δ U m /δ Gm >0 
=>  δQ/δ Lfh= wf/P ………………(ii) 
Taking the total derivative of  (i)  and (ii) with respect to the wage, 
2
0
2
0
2
0
f
fhf
fh
f
L
Q
LL
Q
dL
dL




  
If female own-farm labour is at least partly supervisory, it would seem reasonable that the 
marginal productivity of hired labour is increased by an incremental increase in own farm labour. 
Thus, 
fhf LL
Q


0
2
 >0,   => 
fh
f
dL
dL 0
 >0. 
)
2
2
(
1
fh
f
fh
L
Q
p
dw
dL


   <0  
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and  
2
2
2
[
)
2
(
1
2
0
2
0
2
0
fh
fhf
fh
f
f
f
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Q
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Q
L
Q
L
Q
p
dw
dL









    ]   <0 
Thus the amount of female labour the man wishes to hire for the family farm decreases with an 
increase in the female wage, while on the other hand, increases in the wage rate increase women’s 
desire to supply agricultural wage work. 
 We assume that female workers bargain for higher wages if wage increases result in an 
increase in utility. At least for those women from peasant households, however, the change in 
utility as a result of increases in wage may or may not be positive.  
f
f
f
f
f
ff
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CdU
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
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*)(*
    
By assumption, 
f
f
C
U

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>0. 
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From first order conditions, 
fh
f
L
C


 =0 and 
fo
f
L
C


 =0. 
Thus  
f
f
dw
dC
 =  (
µ
[
1 f
ff wP 

I*) - µf ( Lfh* + Lfo*)] 
Let Z= (
µ
[
1 f
ff wP 

I*) - µf ( Lfh* + Lfo*)] 
 Thus for 
f
ff
dw
CdU *)(*
 >0, or for rises in wages to be welfare enhancing for these women, 
 it must be the case that Z>0 
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or (
µf
fw

I*) > µf ( Lfh* + Lfo*) ……..(iii) 
 If bargaining power shows increasing returns to wages, at low wage rates,  
fw
 fµ
is small 
in equation (iii) above. At low levels of wages I* is likely to be high but so is Lfh*.The relative 
sizes of each would determine whether or not condition (iii) will hold and 
f
ff
dw
CdU *)(*
>0.  An 
increase in wages thus may or may not result in increases in female welfare overall, and thus 
lowers the incentive to participate in the process of bargaining for higher wages.  
The situation would be different for women from non-cultivating households for whom 
rising real wages in agriculture would be unambiguously welfare enhancing. However, if a 
significant share of the female agricultural labour-force is comprised of women from peasant 
households, the ability of women workers to effectively bargain as a unit would be influenced by 
the incentives of the latter.  
Impact of Liberalization  
Belief in the empowering effects of female labour force participation is an important 
aspect of the claim that liberalised economies are associated with increases in women’s well-
being. Liberalisation is linked to increased labour force participation, and reduced gender wage 
differentials. Women’s labour force participation is in turn linked with improved bargaining 
outcomes for women (World Bank 2001). The impact of liberalisation in rural Telangana may, 
however, have a less positive impact upon the bargaining power of women. 
 As discussed earlier, the price of important capital inputs such as electricity and fertilizer 
in the Telangana region rose in the aftermath of liberalization, while output prices remained 
stagnant (Vakulabharanam 2004, Rao and Suri 2006).  In the model above, taking total 
derivatives of the first order conditions with respect to Pk, 
k
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k
fo
dP
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=0 
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and 
kdP
dI *
 = - (µf   / Pf ) K ,  < 0 
Thus 
kdP
dZ
- 
wf
µf
µf   K/Pf ,   < 0 
 A rising price of capital makes it less likely that the condition (iii) above under which 
increases in wages would increase women’s utility will be satisfied. Thus the unfolding of 
liberalization in Telangana, given the highly feminised agricultural wage labour-force, could 
imply that women are dissuaded from bargaining for higher wages as workers, thus contributing 
further to the widening of the gender wage differential. 
 
